*613 682 554 57 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before the whole tribe."

*613 554 682 [692] The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of 682 178 [626] blood-revenge has [illegible] but disappeared as a mechanism of social control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out [619] [721] [829] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to

*613 682 554 578 "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the [571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political order.

619 groups were expected to help. For these reasons the Sa'adi tribes com-
619 peted and even fought among themselves for the newcoming Murabiteen
721 groups which continued to migrate into the area, escaping the strong dominance of the Cyrenaica Bedouins..Many of the major tribal wars which occurred in the area before the turn of the century had as their major cause the competition over the Murabiteen.

619 As a vassal group the Murabiteen tribes are kept in an inferior
778 position. This inferiority has certain manifestation, the most obvious
184 of which is the deprivation of the Murabiteen of the right of "nazala"
682 or refuge. When a person is killed the killer and his kin unit seek re-
778 fuge at a neutral tribal segment, and for a period of twelve months they
613 are safe from the revenge of the victim's kin group. The victim's family
[671] cannot follow them to the refuge place, for to do this is to violate one of the basic principles of Awlad Ali law. The philosophy behind the rule of "nazala" is to give time for "the blood to cool off" as one of the informants described it. It also gives the host group a chance to start immediate negotiations with the victim's group to settle permanently the dispute. As soon as the murderer's group takes refuge, which is done either by moving along with their tents and flocks and settling in the locality of the host group or symbolically by having the head of the host group send one of his sons or male relatives to pitch his tent in the locality of the murderer's group, the head of the host group contacts the victim's group, informs them that he has been chosed by the murderer's group in accordance with the right of nazala, and asks for their permission to grant his protection to the murderer's group. To ask for the permission of the victim's group is a matter of formality since, by custom, they cannot refuse to grant this permission except on one single ground:

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

III

*175 *648 *795 What gave the Bedouin the courage to endure the hardships and bereavements of the struggle? Certainly those two great sentiments, patriotism and religion. I have said that the first Italo-Sanusi war began as a war against Turkey and slowly became transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The war against the Sanusiya also became transformed slowly into a simple struggle of the Bedouin for survival, for their lands and their freedom to live their ancient way of life; and in this struggle they felt themselves, in spite of all their cleavages and feuds, to be at one against the intruder. Beneath the surface of political expressions the issue was the same in both wars: whether the Italians could deprive the Bedouin of their lands and colonize them. Whether the Bedouin fought in the name of the Sultan or of the Sanusiya, or just fought, they always realized, from the first days of the struggle, that the issue was their right to live by their own laws in their own land. In the first war the outer bark of Turkish administration was stripped. [619] In the second war the inner bark of Sanusiya organization was ripped off, leaving bare beneath it the hard wood of the tribal system.

*175 *648 *795 • 727 798 619 The war also, as wars have a way of doing, bared the religious content in the struggle. The Caliph had declared a religious war, but when the Caliphate no longer counted in Cyrenaica, or indeed anywhere else, the war continued to be fought in the name of a religious Order. With the destruction of the Sanusiya it still went on in the name of religion. It then became simply a war of Muslims to defend their faith against a Christian Power. Deep love of home and deep love of God nourished each other. In fighting for their lands and herds the Bedouin were fortified by the knowledge that they fought also for their faith. Without due appreciation of the religious feelings involved in the resistance it would, I think, be impossible to understand how it went on for so long against such overwhelming odds or how the tribes, with a long history of feuds dividing them, co-operated as much as they did under Sanusiya guidance.

*175 *648 *795 619 From their experiences in the first war the Italians had learned to expect that they would be more strongly resisted in Cyrenaica

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim's group now had to avenge not only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide, but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent, or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each successive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other. If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to open negotiations will be made. The offender's camp may be raided by a *ghazi* recruited from the victim's kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned campaigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.